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ABSTRACT 
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and 
analysing them for signs of possible incidents, which are violations or imminent threats of violation of computer 
security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices. An intrusion detection system (IDS) 
monitors network traffic and monitors for suspicious activity and alerts the system or network administrator. It 
identifies  unauthorized  use,  misuse,  and  abuse  of  computer  systems  by  both  system  insiders  and  external 
penetrators.  Intrusion  detection  systems  (IDS)  are  essential  components  in  a  secure  network  environment, 
allowing for early detection of malicious activities and attacks. By employing information provided by IDS, it is 
possible to apply appropriate countermeasures and mitigate attacks that would otherwise seriously undermine 
network security. However, Increasing traffic and the necessity of stateful analysis impose strong computational 
requirements  on  network  intrusion  detection  systems  (NIDS),  and  motivate  the  need  of  architectures  with 
multiple  dynamic  sensors.  In  a  context  of  high  traffic  with  heavy  tailed  characteristics,  static  rules  for 
dispatching traffic slices among sensors cause severe imbalance. The current high volumes of network traffic 
overwhelm most IDS techniques requiring new approaches that are able to handle huge volume of log and 
packet analysis while still maintaining high throughput. This paper shows that the use of dynamic agents has 
practical  advantages  for  intrusion  detection.  Our  approach  features  unsupervised  adjustment  of  its 
configuration and dynamic adaptation to the changing environment, which improvises the performance of IDS 
significantly. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Intrusion Detection is the process of monitoring and analysing the information sources, in order to 
detect  malicious  information.  It  has  been  an  active  field  of research  for  over  two  decades. John 
Anderson’s “Computer Security Threat Monitoring and Surveillance” was published in 1980 and has 
embarked upon this field. It was one of the earliest and most famous papers in the field. After that in 
1987,  Dorothy  Denning  published  “An  Intrusion  Detection  Model”,  provided  a  methodological 
framework that inspired many researchers around the world and has laid the groundwork for the early 
commercial products like Real Secure, Trip Wire, Snort, Shadow, and STAT etc. 
Intrusion  Detection  technology  has  evolved  and  emerged  as  one  of  the  most  important  security 
solutions. It has several advantages and it is unique compared to other security tools. As information 
systems  have  become  more  comprehensive  and  a  higher  value  asset  of  organizations,  intrusion 
detection systems have been incorporated as elements of operating systems and network.   
Intrusion  detection  systems  (IDS)  have  a  few  basic  objectives.    Among  these  objectives  are 
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, and Accountability. International Journal of Advances in Engineering & Technology, July, 2014. 
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Intrusion  Detection  Systems  (IDS)  are  important  mechanisms  which  play  a  key  role  in  network 
security and self-defending networks. Such systems perform automatic detection of intrusion attempts 
and malicious activities in a network through the analysis of traffic captures and collected data in 
general. Such data is aggregated, analysed and compared to a set of rules in order to identify attack 
signatures, which are traffic patterns present in captured traffic or security logs that are generated by 
specific types of attacks. In the process of identifying attacks and malicious activities an IDS parses 
large quantities of data searching for patterns which match the rules stored in its signature database. 
Such procedure demands high processing power and data storage access velocities in order to be 
executed  efficiently  in large  networks.  The  next  part of the  paper discuss  about classification  of 
Intrusion Detection Systems. The section II of the paper discuss about dynamic sensor agents for 
improvising the performance of IDS. Section III discuss about the algorithm for using the dynamic 
agent for improvising the performance of IDS. Section IV analyse and show the improvement in 
performance of IDS implementation using agent followed by conclusion and future work in section V. 
1.1 Classification of Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusions can be divided into 6 main types:-  
1.  Attempted  break-ins,  which  are  detected  by  a  typical  behaviour  profiles  or  violations  of 
security constraints.  
2.  Masquerade  attacks,  which  are  detected  by  atypical  behaviour  profiles  or  violations  of 
security constraints.  
3.  Penetration of the security control system, which are detected by  monitoring  for specific 
patterns of activity.  
4.  Leakage, which is detected by atypical use of system resources.  
5.  Denial of service, which is detected by atypical use of system resources.  
6.  Malicious  use,  which  is  detected  by  a  typical  behaviour  profiles,  violations  of  security 
constraints, or use of special privileges.  
However, we can divide the techniques of intrusion detection into two main types. IDSs issue security 
alerts when an intrusion or suspect activity is detected through the analysis of different aspects of 
collected data (e.g. packet capture files and system logs). Classical intrusion detection systems are 
based on a set of attack signatures and filtering rules which model the network activity generated by 
known  attacks  and  intrusion  attempts  [8].  Intrusion  detection  systems  detect  malicious  activities 
through basically two approaches: anomaly detection and signature detection [9][21][20]. 
i.  Anomaly Detection  
This technique is based on the detection of traffic anomalies. The deviation of the monitored traffic 
from the normal profile is measured. Various different implementations of this technique have been 
proposed, based on the metrics used for measuring traffic profile deviation. 
Anomaly detection techniques assume that all intrusive activities are necessarily anomalous. This 
means that if we could establish a "normal activity profile" for a system, we could, in theory, flag all 
system states varying from the established profile by statistically significant amounts as intrusion 
attempts.  However,  if  we  consider  that  the  set  of  intrusive  activities  only  intersects  the  set  of 
anomalous activities instead of being exactly the same, we find a couple of interesting possibilities: 
(1) Anomalous activities that are not intrusive are flagged as intrusive. (2) Intrusive activities that are 
not anomalous result in false negatives (events are not flagged intrusive, though they actually are). 
This is a dangerous problem, and is far more serious than the problem of false positives.  
The main issues in anomaly detection systems thus become the selection of threshold levels so that 
neither of the above 2 problems is unreasonably magnified, and the selection of features to monitor. 
Anomaly detection systems are also computationally expensive because of the overhead of keeping 
track of, and possibly updating several system profile metrics. Some systems based on this technique 
are discussed in Section 4 while a block diagram of a typical anomaly detection system is shown in 
Fig 1. International Journal of Advances in Engineering & Technology, July, 2014. 
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Fig 1:- IDS Anomaly Detection System 
ii.  Misuse Detection 
This technique looks for patterns and signatures of already known attacks in the network traffic. A 
constantly updated database is usually used to store the signatures of known attacks. The way this 
technique deals with intrusion detection resembles the way that anti-virus software operates. 
The concept behind misuse detection schemes is that there are ways to represent attacks in the form of 
a pattern or a signature so that even variations of the same attack can be detected. This means that 
these systems are not unlike virus detection systems -- they can detect many or all known attack 
patterns, but they are of little use for as yet unknown attack methods. An interesting point to note is 
that anomaly detection systems try to detect the complement of "bad" behaviour. Misuse detection 
systems try to recognize known "bad" behaviour. The main issues in misuse detection systems are 
how to write a signature that encompasses all possible variations of the pertinent attack, and how to 
write signatures that do not also match non-intrusive activity. Several methods of misuse detection, 
including a new pattern matching model are discussed later. A block diagram of a typical misuse 
detection system is shown in Fig 2 below.  
 
 
Fig 2:-IDS Misuse Detection System 
Intrusion  detection  systems  are  further  can  also  be  classified  in  two  groups,  Network  Intrusion 
Detection Systems (NIDS), which are based on data collected directly from the network, and Host 
Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS), which are based on data collected from individual hosts. HIDSs 
are composed basically by software agents which analyse application and operating system logs, file 
system activities, local databases and other local data sources, reliably identifying local intrusion 
attempts. Such systems are not affected by switched network environments (which segment traffic 
flows) and is effective in environments where network packets are encrypted (thwarting usual traffic 
analysis techniques). However, they demand high processing power overloading the nodes’ resources 
and may be affected by denial-of-service attacks. In face of the growing volume of network traffic and 
high transmission rates, software based NIDSs present performance issues, not being able to analyses 
all the captured packets rapidly enough. Some hardware based NIDSs offer the necessary analysis 
throughput but the cost of such systems is too high in relation to software based alternatives. 
From the above, it is clear that as IDS grow in function and evolve in power, they also evolve in 
complexity. Agents of each new generation of IDS use agents of the previous generation as data 
sources,  applying  ever  more  sophisticated  detection  algorithms  to  determine  ever  more  targeted 
responses. Often, one or more IDS and management system(s) may be deployed by an organization 
within  its  own  network,  with  little  regard  to  their  neighbours  or  the  global  Internet.  Just  as  all 
individual networks and intranets connect to form "The Internet", so can information from stand-alone International Journal of Advances in Engineering & Technology, July, 2014. 
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internal and perimeter host- and network-based intrusion detection systems be combined to create a 
distributed Intrusion Detection System (dIDS).   
Current IDS technology is increasingly unable to protect the global information infrastructure due to 
several problems:  
i.  The existence of single intruder attacks that cannot be detected based on the observations 
of only a single site. 
ii.  Coordinated attacks involving multiple attackers that require global scope for assessment. 
iii.  Normal variations in system behaviour and changes in attack behaviour that cause false 
detection and identification. 
iv.  detection of attack intention and trending is needed for prevention  
v.  Advances in automated and autonomous attacks, i.e. rapidly spreading worms, require 
rapid assessment and mitigation, and  
vi.  The sheer volume of attack notifications received by ISPs and host owners can become 
overwhelming.  
vii.  If  aggregated  attack  details  are  provided  to  the  responsible  party,  the  likelihood  of  a 
positive response increases.  
II.  DYNAMIC SENSOR SELECTION 
In  our  proposed  architecture,  IDS  LOG  can  be  collected  from  multiple  sensors  or agent.  In  this 
section, we present a trust-based algorithm which dynamically determines the best aggregation agent 
and  also  the  optimal  number  of  malicious  or  legitimate  behaviour  necessary  for  the  reliable 
identification of the best aggregation agent, while taking into account the: (i) past effectiveness of the 
individual aggregation agents and (ii) number of aggregation agents and the perceived differences in 
their effectiveness. We decided to use a trust-based approach for evaluating the aggregation agents, 
because it not only eliminates the noise in the background traffic and randomness of the challenge 
selection  process, but accounts for  the  fact that  attackers  might  try  to  manipulate  the  system  by 
inserting misleading traffic flows. An attacker could insert fabricated flows [15] hoping they would 
cause the system to select an aggregation agent that is less sensitive to the threat the attacker actually 
intends to realize. When using trust, one tries to avoid this manipulation by dynamically adapting to 
more recent actions of an attacker [4][16]. 
The problem features a set of classifier agents } ,..., { g A    that process a single, shared open-ended 
sequence ... ,...,. 1 i     of incoming events and use their internal models to divide these events into 
two  categories:  normal  and  anomalous.  The  events  are  inherently  of  two  fundamental  types: 
legitimate and malicious, and the goal of the classifier agents is to ensure that the normal class as 
provided by the agent is the best possible match to the legitimate traffic class, while the anomalous 
class should match the malicious class. The classification thus has four possible outcomes [17] for 
each event  ϕ, two of them being correct classifications and two of them the errors (see also the 
confusion matrix in Table 1). 
Table 1: Confusion Matrix 
  actual class 
legitimate  malicious 
classification  normal  true positive  false positive 
anomalous  false negative  true negative 
The classifier agents actually provide more information, as they internally annotate the individual 
events with a continuous “normality” value in the [0, 1] interval, with the value1 corresponding to 
perfectly normal events and the value 0 to completely anomalous ones. This continuous anomaly 
value describes an agent’s opinion regarding the anomaly of the event, and the agents apply adaptive 
or predefined thresholds to split the [0, 1] interval into the normal and anomalous classes. 
Given that the characteristics of the individual classifier agents k are unknown in the dynamically-
changing environment, the system needs to be able to identify the optimal classifier autonomously. 
Furthermore, the system can have several users with different priorities regarding the detection of 
specific types of malicious events. In the network monitoring use-case, some of the users concentrate International Journal of Advances in Engineering & Technology, July, 2014. 
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on major, infrastructure-type events only (such as denial of service attacks),while the other users seek 
information about more subtle attack techniques targeting individual hosts. The users are represented 
by the user agents and these agents are assumed to know their users preferences. Their primary goal is 
to use their knowledge of user preferences to dynamically identify the optimal information source and 
to change the source when the characteristics of the environment or user preferences change. To reach 
this goal in an environment where they have no abstract model of classifier agents’ performance, they 
rely on empirical analysis of classifier agents’ response to a pre-classified set of challenges [11][19]. 
In the following, we will analyse the problem from the perspective of a single user agent, which tries 
to select the best available classification agent, while keeping the number of challenges as low as 
possible. The challenges are events with known classification, which can be inserted into the flow of 
background events as observed by the system, processed by the classifier agents together with the 
background  events  and  finally  removed  before  the  system  reports  the  results  to  the  users.  The 
processing of the challenges allows the user agents to identify the agent which achieves the best 
separation  of  the  challenges  that  represent  known  instances  of  legitimate  behaviour  from  the 
challenges that represent known malicious behaviour[13][7][18]. 
III.  ALGORITHM 
In this section we present a simple but adaptive algorithm for choosing the best classifier agent. For 
each time step   i , the algorithm proceeds as follows: 
For each time step i ∈ N, the algorithm proceeds as follows: 
i.  Let each aggregation agent classify a set of known instances of malicious or legitimate 
behaviour  from  different  attack  classes  and  selected  legitimate  known  instances  of 
malicious or legitimate behaviour. 
ii.  Update the trust value of each aggregation agent, based on its performance on the known 
instances of malicious or legitimate behaviour in time step i. 
iii.  Accept the output of the aggregation agent with the highest trust value as classification of 
the remaining events of time step i. 
Known instances of malicious or legitimate behaviour detection and aggregation agents in each time 
step  i  with  the  sets  of  flows  for  which  we  already  know  the  actual  class,  i.e.  whether  they  are 
malicious or legitimate. So, we challenge an aggregation agent α with a set of malicious events, 
belonging to K attack classes and a set of legitimate events drawn from a single class. With respect to 
each class of attacks k, the performance of the agent is described by a mean and a standard deviation: 
) , (
k
x
k
x   for the set of malicious challenges and  ) , ( x y   for the set of legitimate challenges. Both 
means lie in the interval [0, 1], and 
k
x  close to 0 and  y  close to 1 signify accurate classifications of 
the agent respectively. 
  The system used to perform the experiments described in this paper incorporates five different 
anomaly detection [5] techniques presented in literature [10][1] [12][2]. Each of the methods works 
with a different traffic model based on a specific combination of aggregate traffic features, such as: 
  Entropies of flow characteristics for individual source IP addresses. 
  Deviation of flow entropies from the PCA-based prediction model of individual sources. 
  Deviation of traffic volumes from the PCA-based prediction for individual major sources. 
  Rapid surges in the number of flows with given characteristics from the individual sources  
and 
  Ratios  between  the  number  of  destination  addresses  and  port  numbers  for  individual 
sources. 
These algorithms maintain a model of expected traffic on the network and compare it with real traffic 
to identify the discrepancies that are identified as possible attacks. They are effective against zero-day 
attacks  and  previously  unknown  threats,  but  suffer  from  a  comparatively  higher  error  rate 
[17][10][11], frequently classifying legitimate traffic as anomalous(false positives), or failing to spot 
malicious flows (false negatives). The classifier agents can be divided to two distinct classes: 
  Detection  agents  analyse  raw  network  flows  by  their  anomaly  detection  algorithms, 
exchange the anomalies between them and use the aggregated  anomalies to build and International Journal of Advances in Engineering & Technology, July, 2014. 
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update the long-term anomaly associated with the abstract traffic classes built by each 
agent. Each detection agent uses one of the five anomaly detection techniques mentioned 
above. All agents map the same events (flows), together with the same evaluation of these 
events, the aggregated immediate anomaly of these events determined by their anomaly 
detection algorithms, into the traffic clusters built using different features/metrics, thus 
building the aggregate anomaly hypothesis based on different premises. The aggregated 
anomalies associated with the individual traffic classes are built and maintained using the 
classic trust modelling techniques (not to be confused with the way trust is used in this 
work). 
  Aggregation agents represent the various aggregation operators used to build the joint 
conclusion regarding  the normality/anomaly  of the flows  from  the  individual  opinions 
provided by the detection agents. Each agent uses a distinct averaging operator (based on 
order-weighted  averaging  or  simple  weighted  averaging)  to  perform  the  Rgdet→  R 
transformation from the gdet-dimensional space to a single real value, thus defining one 
composite  system  output  that  integrates  the  results  of  several  detection  agents.  The 
aggregation agents also dynamically determine the threshold values used to transform the 
continuous  aggregated  anomaly  value  in  the  [0,  1]  interval  into  the  crisp  normal/ 
anomalous assessment for each flow. 
The user agent functionality is implemented as a collection of the agents. The user agent creates 
individual  challenge  agents,  each  of  them  representing  a  specific  incident  in  the  past,  and  these 
temporary, single purpose agents interact with the data-provisioning layers of the system in order to 
insert the flows relative to the incident into the background traffic and to retrieve and analyse the 
detection results provided by the classifier agents. 
IV.  RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF AGENT BASED IDS 
We have simulated and tested the IDS using the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. The implementation gives us 
the expected results. Our Agent based IDS prototype we are testing detects the simulated attacks. The 
question  is  :  why  the  realization  of  the  system  with  agents  is  advantageous?  We  implement  a 
centralized system with local sensor that forward filtered data to a central analysis node and compare 
it with Agent IDS. 
Agent based IDS has proven itself to be capable of handling very high traffic. In such a design, the 
incoming network traffic is disseminated to a pool of agents, which process a fraction of the whole 
traffic, reducing the possibility of packet loss caused by overload. Agent IDS could support a load of 
up to 56 Mbps (450 packets/second) with zero traffic loss. Moreover, we focus on a second important 
criterion for IDS: detection delay which is defined as the duration from the time the attack starts to the 
time epoch that the attack is detected. We generate a set of packets varied from 1000 to 8000. For 
each set we simulate the attack and we calculate the detection delay. Figure3 plots the measurement 
results. The detection delay is significantly reduced; Agent IDS is much faster than the centralized 
IDS. For example, in the case of 8000 packets, we observe that detection delay is reduced by 56% 
(7.91second vs 4.4 second). This can be explained by the fact that agents operate directly on the host, 
where an action has to be taken, their response is faster than systems where the actions are taken by 
central coordinator. 
In fact, one of the most pressing problems facing current IDSs is the processing of the enormous 
amounts of data generated by the network traffic monitoring tools and host-based audit logs. IDSs 
typically process most of this data locally. Agents offer an opportunity to reduce the network load by 
eliminating the need for this data transfer. Instead of transferring the data across the network, agents 
can be dispatched to the machine on which the data resides, essentially moving the computation to the 
data, instead of moving the data to the computation. It is obvious to see that the code-shipping versus 
data-shipping argument is only valid if, the agent’s code and state that have to be transmitted are not 
larger than the amount of data that can be saved by the use of an agent. Agent IDS does not only 
perform better in terms of effectiveness but also in terms of detection delay. 
 International Journal of Advances in Engineering & Technology, July, 2014. 
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Fig 3:- Performance of Centralize IDS vs Agent Based IDS 
V.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We  take  advantage  of  the  multi-agent  paradigm  especially  concerning  reducing  Network  Load. 
Indeed, agents offer the possibility to eliminate the need of transferring a huge amount of data to be 
analysed. In this paper we have explained the architectural design and performance analysis of a 
Centralize IDS vs. Agent based IDS. The experimental result was positive and we found that this 
work can be continued with several other improvement and performance analysis As network attacks 
are becoming more and more alarming, exploiting systems faults and performing malicious actions 
the  need  to  provide  effective  intrusion  detection  methods  increases.  Network-based,  distributed 
attacks are especially difficult to detect and require coordination among different intrusion detection 
components or systems. The experiments emphasize the aim of applying agent to detect some kind of 
intrusions and compete others IDS.  
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